

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 11398 01 OF 03 081831Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----108742 081854Z /47

O R 081755Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7045
INFO AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 CAIRO 11398

EXDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, PINR, EG, CD, SU
SUBJ: SADAT ON CHADIAN DEVELOPMENTS

REF (A) STATE 158601, (B) STATE 158603, (C) CAIRO 11293,

SUMMARY: IN MEETING WITH SADAT TODAY, I TOLD HIM PRES CARTER
OR VP MONDALE, PLUS SECRETARY, WILL RECEIVE CHADIAN VP.
EMPHASIZED THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE WILL BE ABLE MEET CHADIAN
ARMS REQUEST. SADAT GRATIFIED AND INDICATED IT ENOUGH IF
VP AND SEC MET CHADIAN REP. RELATED HIS DISCUSSION WITH NUMAYRI
AND MALLOUM AT LIBREVILLE RE CHAD. NAMAYRI MUCH BETTER
ACQUAINTED WITH CHADIAN SITUATION THAN HE HAD SUPPOSED.
NUMAYRI EXPLAINED MUSLIM DIMENSION OF CHADIAN INSURGENCY
WHICH GIVES IT CONSIDERABLE POPULARITY. BECAUSE
OF THIS, NUMAYRI COUNSELED CAUTION, ALTHOUGH HE AGREED ON
NEED KEEP QADHAFI FROM ACHIEVING HIS OBJECTIVES IN CHAD.
MALLOUM RELATED HIS UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OBTAIN ARMS FROM USG
AND FRANCE. HENCE, CHADIAN PRES HAD HAD TO TURN TO SOVIETS
WHO HAD SUPPLIED PALTRY QUANTITY OF PTRS, 75 MM GUNS,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 11398 01 OF 03 081831Z

MACHINE GUNS, HAND GRENADES AND AMMO. SOVIETS USING AMMO AS
LEVERAGE TO PRESSURE MALLOUM TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH GOUKOUNI.
SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 8 AND 80 SOVIET EXPERTS SENT TO "TRAIN"
CHADIAN TROOPS. ALTHOUGH NUMAYRI DEMANDED SOVIET EXPERTS
BE EXPELLED, SADAT SAID IT WAS NATURAL FOR MALLOUM TO ACCEPT
THEM IN LIGHT USG AND FRENCH REFUSAL TO HELP. IT ESSENTIAL THAT
EGYPT AND SUDAN COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT MALLOUM TO EN-

ABLE HIS RESIST SOVIET/LIBYAN PRESSURES. AGREEMENT REACHED TO DO SO AND ALSO TO TRY TO FACILITATE MALLOUM/HABRE RE-APPROACHMENT USING SUDANESE GOOD OFFICES.

AT MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT SADAT RECEIVED URGENT MESSAGE FROM MALLOUM SAYING SITUATION GRAVE AFTER FALL OF BARDAI AND ASKING THAT SUDAN AGREE TO OCCUPY PARTS OF EASTERN CHAD TO FREE CHADIAN FORCES FOR COMBAT AGAINST NORTHERN INSURGENTS. SIMILAR MESSAGE SENT TO NUMAYRI. AS RESULT, SADAT SENT URGENT MESSAGE TO NUMAYRI ASKING HIM TO COMPLY WITH CHADIAN REQUEST. EGYPTIAN OPERATIONS OFFICER DESPATCHED TO KHARTOUM TODAY TO WORK WITH NUMAYRI FOR THIS PURPOSE. ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT YET SEEN EGYPTIAN/SUDANESE MILITARY MISSION REPORT, SADAT ACKNOWLEDGED IT APPARENTLY SUGGESTS SITUATION NOT AS BAD AS IT WAS PRESUMED TO BE. THIS GAVE ME CHANCE PRESENT OUR ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT CHADIAN SITUATION. SADAT'S REACTION WAS THAT WE 90 PERCENT IN AGREEMENT; DIFFERENCE IS ON EXTENT OF SOVIET AND LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT AND PURPOSES. HE THOUGHT WASHINGTON, BEING MORE DISTANT FROM SCENE, DOES NOT "FEEL" SOVIET/LIBYAN THREAT TO MODERATE AFRICAN REGIMES AS THOSE IN AREA DO. WHILE RECOGNIZING US ARMS POLICY LIMITATIONS, HE AGAIN URGED THAT SOME MILITARY HELP BE SENT TO CHAD, EITHER THROUGH SUDAN OR EGYPT. WE AGREED KEEP IN TOUCH.
END SUMMARY

1. HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM HOUR LONG MEETING WITH SADAT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 11398 01 OF 03 081831Z

IN ALEXANDRIA. AS FAHMY HAD INTIMATED, PURPOSE OF SADAT'S SUMMONS WAS TO DISCUSS CHADIAN DEVELOPMENTS. RECALLING OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION OF CHAD (CAIRO 11017). SADAT SAID TWO THINGS HAD OCCURRED IN INTERVENING PERIOD: FIRST, HE HAD DISCUSSED SITUATION WITH BOTH NUMAYRI AND MALLOUM AT LIBREVILLE; SECOND, HE HAD AT MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT RECEIVED NEW APPEAL FROM MALLOUM. HE WANTED PRES CARTER TO KNOW ABOUT BOTH THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

2. SADAT THEN ASKED IF FAHMY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ME EARLY THIS MORNING ABOUT THE PROPOSED VISIT OF THE CHADIAN VP TO WASHINGTON. I TOLD HIM THAT FAHMY HAD CALLED ME TO CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN AND THAT I HAD AT ONCE SENT A MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON. I WAS HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO TELL HIM THAT EITHER THE PRES OR THE VP, PLUS THE SECRETARY, WILL RECEIVE THE CHADIAN EMISSARY. I EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT OUR WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE THE EMISSARY DOES NOT MEAN WE WILL BE ABLE TO GRANT THE CHADIAN REQUEST FOR ARMS. AS THE PRESIDENT KNEW, ANY DECISION ON ARMS INVOLVES FOR US MANY COMPLEX FACTORS, INCLUDING THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEW ARMS POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. WE WILL, OF COURSE, STUDY THE CHADIAN REQUEST, BUT WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC AS TO THE EXTENT

TO WHICH WE COULD COMPLY. IN THIS CONNECTION, I NOTED THAT WE ARE ALSO IN CONSULTATION WITH THE FRENCH ON CHADIAN DEVELOPMENTS. SADAT EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO RECEIVE THE CHADIAN EMISSARY, BUT INDICATED THAT IT HAD NEVER BEEN HIS INTENTION TO SUGGEST THAT CARTER HAS TO RECEIVE HIM. IF FAHMY SAID THIS, IT HAD BEEN HIS OWN IDEA. IF VP MONDALE CAN DO SO, THIS IS PERFECTLY FINE. IT HAD BEEN HIS HOPE THAT SEC VANCE COULD RECEIVE HIM.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 11398 02 OF 03 090702Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 /026 W

-----120962 090719Z /16-47

O R 081755Z JUL 77

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7046

INFO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 CAIRO 11398

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

3. AT LIBREVILLE, SADAT RELATED, HE HAD MET WITH NUMAYRI ALONE ON THE FIRST DAY. THEY HAD DISCUSSED CHADIAN SITUATION AT GREAT LENGTH. HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO FIND NUMAYRI FAR BETTER ACQUAINTED WITH SITUATION THAN HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SUPPOSED. IN FACT, NUMAYRI HAD ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO SADAT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHADIAN PROBLEM. NUMAYRI HAD POINTED OUT THAT CHADIAN POPULATION IS NINETY PERCENT MUSLIM AND TEN PERCENT CHRISTIAN, PLUS SOME PAGAN ELEMENTS. MALLANM AND HIS PREDECESSOR ARE CHRISTIANS, BUT COME FROM A RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT TRIBE. NUMAYRI HAD NOTED THAT QADHAFI HAS MADE THE CHADIAN INSURGENCY A MUSLIM VERSUS CHRISTIAN ISSUE. UNFORTUNATELY, NUMAYRI HAD OBSERVED, THIS HAS GIVEN IT MORE POPULARITY THAN IT DESERVES. THE

TRIBES OF EASTERN CHAD, ACCORDING TO NUMAYRI ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF WESTERN SUDAN. THEY ARE MUSLIM AND IN MANY INSTANCES RELATED. NUMAYRI HAD THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 11398 02 OF 03 090702Z

EGYPT AND SUDAN SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE CHADIAN PROBLEM SINCE THE INSURGENCY, ESPECIALLY AS A MUSLIM ISSUE, IS POPULAR IN MUCH OF THE COUNTRY. NUMAYRI HAD AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT QADHAFI SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ACHIEVE HIS AIM.

4. SUBSEQUENTLY, SADAT AND NUMAYRI HAD MET WITH LALLOUM. LALLOUM RELATED THAT HE HAD REQUESTED ARMS FROM US, BUT THAT WE HAD REFUSED. HE HAD THEN ASKED THE FRENCH FOR ARMS, BUT THEY WERE ALSO UNABLE TO HELP HIM. HENCE, ACCORDING TO MALLOUM, HE HAD HAD NO ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO GO TO THE SOVIETS. ASKED WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN HIM, MALLOUM SAID SOME (NUMBER UNSPECIFIED) PTR ARMORED VEHICLES, SOME 75 MILLIMETER GUNS, SOME MACHINEGUNS AND SOME HAND GRENADES. SADAT SCOFFED THAT THE ENTIRE VALUE OF THE ARMS MALLOUM HAD RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIETS COULD NOT BE MORE THAN ONE TO TWO MILLION DOLLARS. MOREOVER, THE PTR'S WERE NOT WELL SUITED TO THE CHADIAN TERRAIN SINCE THEY ARE NOT HALF-TRACKED. (AS AN ASIDE, HE NOTED EGYPT IS ALREADY MANUFACTURING A TYPE OF PTR, THE SALADIN.)

5. NUMAYRI HAD CLEVERLY ASKED MALLOUM WHETHER SOVIET EXPERTS HAD COME. MALLOUM CLAIMED EIGHT SOVIET EXPERTS HAD COME TO TRAIN HIS PEOPLE. NUMAYRI SAID HE HAS HEARD ABOUT EIGHTY SOVIETS HAD COME. HERE SADAT INTERJECTED IT DID NOT MATTER MUCH WHETHER EIGHT OR EIGHTY HAD ARRIVED; AFTER BOTH THE USG AND FRANCE HAD TURNED DOWN MALLOUM, IT WAS NATURAL FOR HIM TO GO TO THE SOVIETS. NUMAYRI HAS INSISTED THAT THE SOVIET EXPERTS SHOULD BE SENT OUT AS A CONDITION OF EGYPTIAN/SUDANESE ASSISTANCE. SADAT HAD COUNSELED THAT THIS IS NOT REALLY THE ISSUE. THE REAL ISSUE IS THE NEED FOR EGYPT AND SUDAN TO ASSIST MALLOUM IN A MANNER WHERE "THE SOVIET GAME THROUGH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 11398 02 OF 03 090702Z

QADHAFI" IS NOT ALLOWED TO CONTINUE. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INSURGENTS, SADAT REITERATED, IS NOT MORE THAN 3,000 RPT 3,000. NUMAYRI AND HE HAD DISCUSSED THE ENTIRE PROBLEM WITH MALLOUM, EVEN THE MUSLIM DIMENSION.

6. THEY HAD DISCOVERED THAT THERE ARE THREE MUSLIM

LEADERS OPPOSING MALLOUM. ONE WAS GOUKOUNI QADAIMI, WHOM SADAT DESCRIBED AS A "100 PERCENT QADHAFI AGENT". GOUKOUNI OPERATES MAINLY IN THE NORTHERN CHAD. THE SECOND, AND MOST IMPORTANT, IS HUSSEIN HABRE. THE LATTER IS FROM AN EASTERN CHADIAN TRIBE WHICH ALSO HAS ROOTS IN THE SUDAN. NUMAYRI HAD TOLD BOTH SADAT AND MALLOUM THAT HABRE FREQUENTLY COME TO KHARTOUM. HE DOES SO SECRETLY SO THAT QADHAFI WILL NOT KNOW ABOUT IT. IN FACT, HABRE WAS IN KHARTOUM DURING THE PERIOD OF THE LIBREVILLE CONFERENCE. HE COULD NOT RECALL THE NAME OF THE THIRD INSURGENT LEADER.

7. AS A RESULT OF THE TRIARTITE TALKS, SEVERAL DECISIONS HAD BEEN REACHED:

(A) EGYPT AND SUDAN WILL ASSIST MALLOUM IN EVERY WAS POSSIBLE. MALLOUM HAD NOTED THAT THE INSURGENTS ALREADY CONTROL THE ENTIRE NORTHERN PART OF CHAD, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS THE "GATEWAY TO THE SUDAN". HE HAD ALSO CLAIMED SOVIETS ARE USING HIS DEPENDENCE ON AMMUNITION SUPPLIED BY THEM AS LEVERAGE TO FORCE HIM TO NEGOTIATE WITH GOUKOUNI.

(B) MALLOUM HAS AGREED TO SEND A SECRET DELEGATION TO KHARTOUM TO MEET WITH HABRE IN ORDER TO TRY TO REACH SOME SORT OF AN AGREEMENT. THE SUDAN WOULD HELP IN THIS EFFORT.

8. AT MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT, SADAT SAID, HE HAD RECEIVED AN URGENT MESSAGE FROM MALLOUM. A SIMILAR MESSAGE HAD BEEN SENT TO NUMAYRI. NOTING THE FALL OF BARDAI, MALLOUM URGED THAT SUDAN SEND TROOPS TO EASTERN CHAD IN ORDER TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 11398 02 OF 03 090702Z

FREE OWN TROOPS TO FIGHT IN THE NORTH AND THAT EGYPT ALSO HELP. SADAT HAD IMMEDIATELY REPLIED TO MALLOUM THAT HE WOULD CONTACT NUMAYRI TO SUPPORT THE CHADIAN REQUEST. THE ISSUE, SADAT FORCEFULLY REITERATED, IS ONE OF COMBATTING SOVIET-SUPPORTED LIBYAN SUBVERSION. IN HIS MESSAGE TO NUMAYRI, HE HAS URGED THE SUDANESE LEADER TO COMPLY. IN SUPPORT OF HIS MESSAGE, HE HAD INSTRUCTED GAMASY TO SEND AN OPERATIONS OFFICER TO KHARTOUM TODAY TO WORK UNDER NUMAYRI'S COMMAND AND TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE SUDANESE PRESIDENT TO MEET MALLOUM'S REQUEST. GOE, HE HAD ASSURED NUMAYRI AND MALLOUM, WILL SUPPORT THE OPERATION IN ANY WAY THAT IT CAN. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBLE USE OF EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT, BUT WAS NOT SPECIFIC.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 11398 03 OF 03 081853Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----108957 081900Z /47

O R 081755Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7047
INFO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 CAIRO 11398

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

9. SADAT NOTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN/SUDANESE MISSION HAS RETURNED, BUT THAT HE HAD NOT YET SEEN ITS REPORT. GAMASY HAD ADVISED HIM IT WOULD BE SENT TODAY, BUT THAT IT SUGGESTS SITUATION NOT AS BAD AS INITIALLY BELIEVED. THIS GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO TELL SADAT THAT WE, TOO, HAVE HEARD THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE JOINT MISSION SUGGEST THAT THE SITUATION MAY NOT BE AS SERIOUS AS INITIALLY SUPPOSED. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD APPRECIATED HIS EARLIER REPORT AND HAS BEEN FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS IN CHAD CLOSELY. I KNEW PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD APPRECIATE SADAT'S LATEST OBSERVATIONS. I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SHARE WITH THE PRESIDENT OUR LATEST ASSESSMENT OF CHADIAN SITUATION AND THEN WENT THROUGH SLOWLY PARA 3 REFTEL B.

10. SADAT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY AND FROM TIME TO TIME NODDED HIS AGREEMENT. AFTER I HAD FINISHED, HE NOTED THAT OUR RESPECTIVE ASSESSMENTS ARE ABOUT NINETY PERCENT IN AGREEMENT. WE DIFFER, AS HE SAW IT, IN OUR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 11398 03 OF 03 081853Z

ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET AND LIBYAN ROLES. HE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE DIVERGENCE: "WE IN THE AREA FEEL THE SOVIET AND LIBYAN ACTIVITY MORE THAN YOU DO IN WASHINGTON. THEY (SOVIETS AND LIBYANS) ARE POURING ARMS

INTO CHAD, ETHIOPIA AND ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA AND THE THREAT, WE BELIEVE, IS DIRECTED AGAINST NOT ONLY MALLOUM, BUT ALSO AGAINST NUMAYRI AND ME." HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BEFORE LONG RECOGNIZE THE CORRECTNESS OF HIS JUDGMENT. HE HOPED IT WOULD NOT BY THEN BE TOO LATE.

11. SADAT THEN COMMENTED THAT THIS IS THE TIME WHEN "WE CAN GET CHAD OUT OF SOVIET JAWS." HE AGAIN URGED THAT SOME ARMS BE PROVIDED, NOT NECESSARILY DIRECTLY TO CHAD BECAUSE HE RECOGNIZED OUR PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD. HE NOTED THAT MANY FRIENDS OF USG ARE PUZZLED AND WORRIED ABOUT WHAT HE CALLED VACILLATING US ARMS POLICY. USG SEEMS TO WORK IN EXTREMES. WE HAVE POURED HUGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS INTO VIETNAM AND ELSEWHERE; NOW--EXCEPT FOR ISRAEL-- WE ARE RELUCTANT TO PROVIDE ARMS EVEN WHERE THEY ARE LEGITIMATELY NEEDED. THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME HAPPY MEDIUM IN OUR ARMS POLICY. HE URGED THAT SMALL ARMS BE PROVIDED FOR CHAD, EITHER THROUGH SUDAN OR EGYPT. I RECALLED MY EARLIER REMARK THAT WE COULD GIVE HIM NO ASSURANCE THAT WE COULD BE FORTHCOMING ON ARMS. I WOULD, OF COURSE, REPORT HIS LATEST REQUEST.

12. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. MY NEXT MEETING WITH SADAT IS AT 1300, JULY 10, WITH SENATOR JAVITS.

13. COMMENT: SADAT'S MESSAGE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. HE HOPES WE WILL EVENTUALLY AGREE TO PROVIDE SOME ARMS TO CHAD, THROUGH SUDAN OR EGYPT, AND WILL BE WAITING TO HEAR OUTCOME OF CHADIAN EMISSARY'S VISIT TO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 11398 03 OF 03 081853Z

WASHINGTON. HE KNOWS OUR ARMS TRANSFER DILEMMA, BUT CONTINUES TO URGE THAT WE SEE CHADIAN SITUATION IN CONTEXT OF THE NEED TO SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS IN AFRICA AGAINST WHAT HE IS CONVINCED IS A SOVIET-INSPIRED THREAT TO MODERATE AFRICAN REGIMES.

EILTS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN INTEREST REPRESENTATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 08-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977CAIRO11398
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770243-0615
Format: TEL
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770779/aaaacqpe.tel
Line Count: 373
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 3de5146f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 STATE 158601, 77 STATE 158603, 77 CAIRO 11293
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1926151
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SADAT ON CHADIAN DEVELOPMENTS
TAGS: MASS, PINR, EG, CD, SU, (SADAT, ANWAR)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3de5146f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009